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STATE ACTION: CONSTITUTIONAL PHOENIX*
LINO A. GRAGLIA**
It has become almost customary to begin discussions of the "state ac-
tion doctrine" by noting Professor Charles Black's comment that it is a
"conceptual disaster area."' Professor Laurence Tribe agrees that "the
current status of the state action requirement ... yields no coherent doc-
trine."2 My reaction to these assertions is not, of course, to question
them, but to wonder what distinction is being made: What area of con-
stitutional law might the speaker suggest that does not fit that descrip-
tion? All areas of constitutional law-at least, all areas in which the
Supreme Court plays an active role-are conceptual disaster areas, and
the interesting question is why that should be so. It is so, in a word,
because constitutional law is a ruse, not the result of interpreting the
Constitution, as the Court represents, but simply a cover for unauthor-
ized policymaking by judges.' As such, it does not depend upon and
cannot be expected to produce intelligible principles or conceptual
coherence.
I.
Constitutional law is the product of judicial review, the self-bestowed
power of judges to invalidate the acts of other officials and institutions of
government as inconsistent with the Constitution. Judicial review was
born in sin in Marbury v. Madison4 in 1803, and while it could hardly
sink much below, it has rarely risen above the circumstances of its birth.
Marbury, like many leading constitutional cases, may have been brought
* Paper presented at Washington University School of Law on September 29, 1988 at a
conference commemorating the fortieth anniversary of Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
** A. Dalton Cross Professor of Law, University of Texas School of Law.
1. See, eg., Choper, Thoughts on State Action: The "Governmental Function" and "Power
Theory" Approaches, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 757, 757 n.1 (citing Black, "State Action," Equal Protec-
tion and California's Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REv. 69, 95 (1967)).
2. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1699 (2d ed. 1988).
3. See Graglia, "Constitutional Theory'" The Attempted Justification for the Supreme Court's
Liberal Political Program, 65 TEX. L. REV. 789 (1987); Graglia, How the Constitution Disappeared,
COMMENTARY, Feb. 1986, at 19. For a full demonstration in the context of the law of race and the
schools, see L. GRAGLIA, DISASTER BY DECREE: THE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON RACE AND
THE SCHOOLS (1976).
4. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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primarily for the purpose of producing a judicial decision.' Chief Justice
John Marshall heard and wrote the opinion in the case even though his
own conduct as Secretary of State in the Adams administration-it was
he who failed to deliver Marbury's commission-was crucially involved.6
Marshall used the case as an occasion to cast aspersion on his political
opponent, President Jefferson, by asserting, vigorously and in detail, that
Jefferson had violated Marbury's rights. Only after that did he announce
that the Court was without jurisdiction over the case, making his earlier
discussion entirely gratuitous.
The federal statute involved in Marbury, section 13 of the Judiciary
Act of 1789, was passed by Madison and other framers of the Constitu-
tion during the first Congress, and signed by President Washington, who
had presided at the constitutional convention. Marshall, nonetheless, did
not accord section 13 the respect of quoting it in full or even of quoting
the complete sentence from which he extracted the phrase he found in-
consistent with the Constitution, an inconsistency that Madison and
Washington, for example, had apparently failed to notice.' Marshall in
effect created a new statute by giving section 13 an interpretation-
asserting it added to the Court's original jurisdiction-that it cannot bear
when quoted in full.' He then proceeded to find this imaginary statute in
violation of an equally imaginary constitutional prohibition, there being
nothing in the Constitution that prohibits Congress from adding to the
Court's original jurisdiction.9 Finally, coming to the point of the whole
5. See D. DEWEY, MARSHALL VERSUS JEFFERSON: THE POLITICAL BACKGROUND OF MAR-
BURY V. MADISON 86 (1970); QUARRELS THAT HAVE SHAPED THE CONSTITUTION (J. Garrity ed.
1987).
6. See Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DUKE L.J. 1, 8.
7. See M. COHEN, THE FAITH OF A LIBERAL 178-80 (1946).
8. The full sentence of section 13 (with the words quoted by Marshall in italics), which speaks
of appellate jurisdiction and does not as much as mention original jurisdiction, is as follows:
The Supreme Court shall also have appellate jurisdiction from the circuit courts and courts
of the several states, in the cases hereinafter specially provided for; and shall have power to
issue writs of prohibition to the district courts, when proceeding as courts of admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction, and writs of mandamus, in cases warranted by the principles and
usages of law, to any courts appointed, or persons holding office under the authority of the
United States.
Judiciary Act of 1789, § 13, 1 Stat. 73 (emphasis added).
9. The Constitution art. III, § 2, provides:
In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which
a State shall be Party, the Supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the other
Cases before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to
Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall
make.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. This can sensibly be read as guaranteeing the Court a minimum original
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enterprise, he asserted the authority of the Court to question the validity
of legislation on grounds that have been found persuasive by no one, such
as the inherency of judicial review in a written Constitution, even though
other nations had and have written constitutions without judicial review.
Law students begin the study of constitutional law with Marbury and
other opinions of the Great Chief Justice. They cannot help but con-
clude that they are expected in their own careers as lawyers to emulate
the practices of the most revered figure in American law. Such emula-
tion, they will not fail to notice, will have the happy consequence of re-
straining almost not at all what they can do as lawyers.
The study of American constitutional law, from Marbury to the
Court's most recent decisions, is largely the study of trickery. Students
learn, for example, that to say that the constitutional authority of Con-
gress to legislate is limited to its delegated powers with all remaining
legislative power reserved to the states, as provided by the tenth amend-
ment, 0 is not to say that there is anything Congress cannot do, but only
to say that there are many things Congress cannot do openly. They learn
that Congress can actually do anything if it is willing to claim, for exam-
ple, to be regulating interstate commerce,"1 and that the function of the
good constitutional lawyer is to teach this to Congress. The products of
this training, of course, go on to become judges. We must not be too
surprised, therefore, to discover that judicial opinions in constitutional
cases are rarely models of clarity and candor.
II.
The Constitution is a short, simple, and practical document, the pri-
mary purpose of which was to create a national government able to pre-
vent state interference with a national common market. It places few
restrictions on the system of decentralized representative self-government
that it created, and therefore provides judges with little basis, even as-
suming judicial review, for frequent intervention in the political process.
jurisdiction, not as Marshall read it as prohibiting Congress from adding to that jurisdiction. The
Court in effect rejected Marshall's Marbury reasoning in Bors v. Preston, 111 U.S. 252 (1884), hold-
ing that Congress may add to the Court's appellate jurisdiction.
10. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to
the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
11, See, e.g., Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971) (Congress can make "loansharking" a
federal crime); Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (Congress can prohibit
racial discrimination in places of public accommodation); Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111 (1942)
(Congress can prohibit a farmer from growing food on his own land to feed his own family).
1989]
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Because public officials are restricted very little by the Constitution and,
being American citizens, share American values, they have little occasion
and are little tempted to commit constitutional violations. The result is
that examples of clearly unconstitutional laws are rare in our history, 2
even though rulings of unconstitutionality by courts are many and in-
creasingly common.
The first and most important thing to understand about constitutional
law is that it has little to do with the Constitution.' 3 Rulings of unconsti-
tutionality by judges ordinarily reflect only that their policy preferences
differ from those of a majority of their fellow citizens, and their insistence
that their preferences prevail despite the resulting injury to the process of
decentralized self-government created by the Constitution. When Amer-
ican judges declare a law or other official act invalid because it is prohib-
ited by the Constitution, they must be understood to be saying, in
constitutional law's typically disingenuous way, that they consider the
policy expressed in the law or other official act to be mistaken. Because a
finding of state action is typically a threshold requirement in constitu-
tional decisionmaking, one would expect that the issue would be a partic-
ular focus of judicial manipulation, and that has indeed proven to be the
case.
The state action doctrine expresses the general understanding that
constitutional restrictions apply only to government-to acts of public
officials-and not to the acts of private individuals. Ordinary law re-
strains individuals; constitutional limitations are needed only to restrain
government. The second sentence of the first paragraph of the fourteenth
amendment-the putative source of the vast bulk of contemporary con-
stitutional law-expressly prohibits only the "State" from depriving any
person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law or denying
any person the equal protection of the laws. 4 The doctrine reflects the
perception that an injury is generally a more serious matter when it is the
12. The clearest example of such a law is probably the 1933 Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium
Act, debtor relief legislation clearly prohibited by the contracts clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10,
challenged in Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934). In a five to four decision,
however, the Court blew its best, if not its only, opportunity to exercise judicial review legitimately
to invalidate a law by holding that the law was not unconstitutional.
13. See supra note 3.
14. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immuni-
ties of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CON ST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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result of government rather than private action; government action may
have greater impact over a wider area, be more likely to recur, and be
more difficult to escape or prevent. And, unlike private action, it cannot
be justified as a tolerable, even if unfortunate, expression of individuality.
Because the state action requirement limits the scope of the fourteenth
amendment, it serves the cause of separation of powers by limiting op-
portunities for judicial policymaking. It also serves the cause of federal-
ism by limiting control by Congress-under its authority to enforce the
fourteenth amendment-and the federal courts over matters otherwise
left to the states. Because the courts no longer limit Congress' legislative
authority on federalism grounds, however, and are unlikely to limit Con-
gress' fourteenth amendment authority to counteract state action,15 the
state action requirement protects state autonomy today, if at all, only
against the federal courts. Finally, the state action requirement protects
individual autonomy to the extent that it exempts individual conduct
from judicial surveillance.
Of course, government action is not always more problematic than
nongovernment action. The acts of a large corporation, for example, can
obviously be as serious in their impact as the acts of a small municipality
and are no more justifiable in terms of individual autonomy. It seems,
therefore, that constitutional limits should apply to nongovernment ac-
tion whenever it is not significantly distinguishable from government ac-
tion in terms of effects and justification. That, however, does not state a
rule of law but simply authorizes courts to make policy-to determine
the applicability of constitutional restrictions-on a case-by-case basis.
The state action doctrine attempts to state a rule, an objective standard
that increases predictability and limits judicial discretion; but like all
rules it does so at a cost of loss of flexibility. In effect, the question
whether the challenged act was performed by a state actor serves as a
proxy for the much more difficult and policy-oriented question whether
the act's effects and justifications are such that constitutional limitations
ought to apply.
Unfortunately, the state action doctrine often serves as a very poor
proxy for direct consideration of the conflicting interests involved. Not
only can private actions be as problematic as government actions, but
government units obviously cannot be permitted to escape constitutional
15. See United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966) (dicta by six Justices that Congress can
legislate to apply fourteenth amendment restrictions to private parties).
1989]
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restrictions by simply privatizing some of their functions. For example, a
municipality could not make coerced confessions admissible in its courts
by simply leaving law enforcement to private security forces. The state
can easily be said to be responsible for all such supposedly private acts,
but the state can equally be said to be responsible for all acts which it
permits and could constitutionally prohibit. The state action require-
ment can thus easily be made to disappear, as innumerable commenta-
tors have discovered, 6 as a limit on the scope of constitutional
restrictions, that is, as a limit on judicial supervision of all conduct.
III.
It is a very serious mistake, however, to assume, as constitutional ana-
lysts usually do, that elected officials will frequently behave unconstitu-
tionally or otherwise improperly in the absence of judicial supervision.
In fact, as I have said, constitutional violations have been and are ex-
tremely rare; states and cities rarely do such things as privatize police
forces and give misbehaving private actors a free hand. American society
is probably characterized by too much rather than too little statutory
regulation. Only an extreme distrust of representative self-government
can explain the extravagant growth of constitutional restrictions that has
taken place in recent decades and that is generally defended and en-
couraged by constitutional scholars. Unfortunately, there once was a
clear basis for such distrust as to one issue in one area-race discrimina-
tion in the South. The courts, however, have extended the attitudes, hab-
its, and perceived proper role for judges that developed in that context to
other areas of public policy where they are much less justifiable.
Judicial review is generally a bad idea, inevitably in conflict with both
federalism and representative self-government, the essential principles of
our constitutional scheme and the basis of our prosperity and freedom.
To permit an electorally unaccountable individual to exercise the kind of
policymaking power that Justice Brennan, for example, has exercised for
more than thirty years, is, as all human experience indicates, inconsistent
with political health.17 Justice Brennan's actual exercise of that power-
16. See, e.g., Glennon & Nowak, A Functional Analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment State
Action Requirement, 1976 Sup. Cr. REv. 221, and articles cited therein at 227 notes 24-25; Rowe,
The Emerging Threshold Approach to State Action: Trying to Make Sense of Flagg Brothers, Inc. v.
Brooks, 69 GEO. L.J. 745 (1981).
17. At the establishment of our constitutions, the judiciary bodies were supposed to be the
most helpless and harmless members of our government. Experience, however, soon
showed in what way they were to become the most dangerous; that the insufficiency of the
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for instance, by consistently creating or favoring more extensive protec-
tions for the criminally accused-does not provide us with a different
experience.18
If judicial review is justifiable at all in our society, however, it is justi-
fied in regard to questions of race. Judicial review was born in sin in
Marbury v. Madison, but the nation itself can be said to have been born
in sin because of the Constitution's acceptance and protection of slav-
ery.19 This is so even granting that the framers and ratifiers had little
choice but to accept slavery if a single nation was to be created. Judicial
review is uniquely justifiable in connection with race for several reasons.
Mistreatment of blacks is the unique and overwhelming evil of our his-
tory. The denial of legal equality to a minority population on racial
grounds is indefensible by any standard; thus, a major part of the Consti-
tution, the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments, is primarily
concerned with protecting blacks. Violations of the constitutional rights
of blacks can occur and have occurred. Most important, there has been a
national consensus since at least mid-century that discrimination against
blacks must end, even at the cost of removing the issue from local con-
trol, and that the South must conform to a national standard in this re-
gard. This consensus has been difficult to effectuate politically because of
arguable defects-such as congressional committee chairmanships based
on seniority-in the political process. Such defects make it possible to
justify judicial intervention as not only consistent with, but even as an aid
to self-government.
For all these reasons, the end of discrimination against blacks, even if
not clearly state imposed, has seemed so clearly right and necessary as to
justify whatever was required to bring it about. Yet, the courts' efforts to
end such discrimination have greatly distorted our constitutional law in
general and, most particularly, the state action doctrine. Happily, nearly
all significant discrimination against blacks by nongovernmental actors is
means provided for their removal gave them a freehold and irresponsibility in office .... In
truth, man is not made to be trusted for life, if secured against all liability to account.
Letter to Mr. Coray, Oct. 31, 1823, THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 486-87 (A. Bergh ed.
1907).
18. See, e.g., Green v. County School Bd. of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430 (1968) (imposing
a requirement of racial discrimination in the operation of public school systems in the name of
enforcing the prohibition of such discrimination required by Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954)).
19. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 ("three fifths" clause), § 9 (importation of slaves not to be prohibited
until 1808); art. IV, § 2 (return of escaped slaves).
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now prohibited by federal and state statutory law, with the result that the
distorting pressure of "private" race discrimination on the state action
doctrine has been much relaxed. Indeed, the state action doctrine, after
having been virtually obliterated as an impediment to judicial interven-
tion, has now been reinvigorated. It can now be used to serve the essen-
tial, albeit illogical, function of limiting the application of unjustifiable
constitutional restrictions that have resulted from decades of judicial
hyperactivity.
IV.
State action is obviously present and usually will not even be men-
tioned by a court when an officer or employee of the state or other unit of
government performs the challenged act. It is clearly present when the
challenged act is a rule of law, since lawmakers-legislative, judicial, or
administrative-are government officials. The state action doctrine can
be seen, therefore, as the theories that have developed to find state action
when it is not obviously present-such as when the challenged act is not
by a government official-and thereby to make constitutional restrictions
apply. Two basic theories have evolved: private action will constitute
state action when either the state is sufficiently "involved" or "entan-
gled" with the private action or when the private action constitutes the
performance of a "public function." As already noted, however, a state
can be said to be involved in whatever it permits or protects; that is, in all
conduct that a state could prohibit because it is not constitutionally pro-
tected. The public function notion is almost equally elastic because it is
no better defined in this than in other areas of constitutional law.20 The
result is that the two concepts have proven highly manipulable and per-
mit a finding of state action on demand. From the 1940s through the
1960s, the Court expanded these concepts, primarily to enable it to act
against race discrimination, but since the 1970s it has narrowed them to
limit the scope of federal judicial surveillance.
Although it was always understood or assumed that constitutional re-
strictions apply only to the government, one may trace the origins of the
state action doctrine to the Court's decision in the Civil Rights Cases in
1883.21 The Court invalidated the 1875 Civil Rights Act that prohibited
20. See, e.g., National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) ("integral governmental
functions"), overruled by Garcia v. Metropolitan Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985);.Nebbia v. New
York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934) ("businesses affected with a public interest").
21. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
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race discrimination in privately owned as well as state-owned places of
public accommodation. The Court held that the fourteenth amendment
applies only to "State legislation, and State action of every kind,"2 2 and
that Congress' authority to enforce the amendment is limited to remedy-
ing prohibited state action. It is virtually certain that the Supreme Court
would not follow this latter holding today,23 but the decision is still au-
thoritative insofar as it limited the fourteenth amendment's independent
reach. Although there is language in the opinion indicating that the
Court might find state action in the failure of a state to prohibit or pro-
tect against certain private acts,2 4 the holding, as it applies to the facts of
some of the cases involved, indicates otherwise.25 In any event, the
Court has long interpreted the decision to establish that the fourteenth
amendment restricts "only such action as may fairly be said to be that of
the States."
26
The Court first expanded the state action doctrine under the irresisti-
ble pressure of the white primary cases. In these cases, the Court, quite
properly, showed that it was determined to invalidate all arrangements
that effectively denied blacks the right to vote guaranteed them by the
fifteenth amendment. The fifteenth amendment had long been virtually a
dead letter in the South because only Democratic Party candidates could
win elections, and blacks were excluded from participation in the Demo-
cratic Party primaries. The progression of the white primary cases nicely
illustrates how little difference the presence or absence of a state actor or
state legal requirement can make-that state action can be a mere for-
mality of no substantive significance.
In 1927, in Nixon v. Herndon,27 the Court invalidated a Texas statute
that explicitly prohibited blacks from participating in Democratic Party
primaries. The Democratic Party then simply continued to exclude
blacks, though no longer legally required to do so. In 1932, in Nixon v.
Condon,28 the Court disallowed this, too, finding state action on the
22. Id. at 11.
23. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
24. The Court stated that the invalidated federal statute "applies equally to cases arising in
States which have the justest laws respecting the personal rights of citizens, and whose authorities
are ever ready to enforce such laws, as to those which have arisen in States that may have violated
the prohibition of the amendment." 109 U.S. at 14.
25. See L. TRIBE, supra note 2, at 1695 n.16 (one of the states to which the statute would have
applied "had specifically repealed the common law rule of equal access").
26. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948).
27. 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
28. 286 U.S. 73 (1932).
1989]
Washington University Open Scholarship
786 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
somewhat shaky ground that a new Texas law "authorized" the party to
determine the qualifications of members for voting in primaries. Race
discrimination temporarily won this chess match, however. Texas sim-
ply repealed all laws having to do with primary elections and, in 1935,
the Court in Grovey v. Townsend 29 declared that it was unable to find the
necessary state action in the Democratic Party's continued exclusion of
blacks. In Smith v. Allwright 30 in 1944, however, the Court checkmated
Texas' move by holding that when a state delegates to a party the power
to fix qualifications of primary elections, it is a delegation of a state func-
tion and "the State makes the action of the party the action of the
State.",3 1
Thus, the public function rationale for the imposition of constitutional
restrictions on non-state actors was born. Another way of stating the
reason for the result in Smith v. Allwright and Nixon v. Condon, directly
and free of technical jargon, is that to permit the discrimination would be
to make the fifteenth amendment almost completely ineffective, a result
that cannot be correct. The Court did not give this reason, I suggest,
because the holding seems easier to contain when stated in state function
jargon. This jargon makes it appear that the Court is doing something
other than simply looking to the merits of the case and making a policy
judgment that the interest protected by the fifteenth amendment out-
weighs the injury to the Democratic Party's associational interests.
If the Court's stated test had involved simply the effectiveness of the
fifteenth amendment, it clearly would have invited other challenges to
election laws on the same ground. Multimember districts, for example,
might soon be challenged, as they later were anyway32--a challenge that
the Court should, in my view, reject as involving not race discrimination
but simply a policy choice between different theories of representation.
This illustrates a jurisprudential dilemma: rules stated in apparently defi-
nite and objective terms, such as the state action requirement, are often
easily evaded, but rules requiring or permitting direct consideration of
the conflicting interests that create the problem are merely grants of poli-
cymaking power to judges. This is a powerful practical argument against
judicially enforceable constitutional restrictions on self-government. To
avoid evasions of apparently clear rules, judges are forced to make them
29. 295 U.S. 45 (1935).
30. 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
31. Id. at 664-65.
32. See, e.g., Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971).
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less clear and make increasingly pure policy decisions. Judicial poli-
cymaking in the form of ordinary law, changeable by legislative act, is
one thing; judicial policymaking in the form of constitutional law is an-
other, and is almost inevitably inconsistent with the maintenance of a
democratic system of government.
The public function theory of state action was used again, and much
less justifiably, in Marsh v. Alabama in 1946.11 In an opinion by the still
young and highly activist Justice Black, the Court held that a Jehovah's
Witness could not be prohibited from distributing religious literature on
the streets of a company-owned town by state court enforcement of state
trespass law at the request of the town's owner. Exclusion of the plaintiff
by an ordinary town, Black said, would violate the first and fourteenth
amendments-the "incorporation" ruse was already well established as
to the first amendment. The Court found that the company-owned town
had "all the characteristics of any other American town," 34 even though,
of course, it did not-for example, the town collected no taxes and the
residents elected no mayor.
The Court also partly relied on the public function theory in its 1966
holding in Evans v. Newton35 that blacks could not be excluded from a
park which had been devised to the city of Macon, Georgia on the condi-
tion that it be used by whites only. State action was found even though
private individuals replaced the former city trustees assigned under the
will. Whatever the theory used to disallow the discrimination, a whites-
only municipal park seems plainly inconsistent with the purpose of the
equal protection clause-to guarantee blacks the basic civil rights en-
joyed by whites. Because it is hard to imagine that the state or city
would permit such discrimination against any but a disfavored group, it
is realistic, I think, to treat the state's permission as itself racially
discriminatory.
Shelley v. Kraemer,36 decided in 1948, is surely the most famous and
most criticized of the Supreme Court's state action decisions-the Finne-
gan's Wake of constitutional law, according to Professor Kurland. The
Court purported to find unconstitutional state action in state court en-
forcement of racially restrictive covenants prohibiting the sale of real es-
tate to nonwhites. The Court said that state court enforcement of a
33. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
34. Id. at 502.
35. 382 U.S. 296 (1966).
36. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
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private contract in accordance with state law constitutes state action, cit-
ing cases and arguing to establish what was undeniable and undenied.
But the mystery is, why was such state action unconstitutional? The
Court did not adopt the unmanageably broad and unappealing proposi-
tion that a state may not enforce a private contract involving discrimina-
tion that the state could not itself practice, such as a will leaving money
to a church. Nor did it attempt to fit the case into public function jargon,
as it might plausibly have done, by asserting that the state had in effect
delegated its power of residential zoning to the private parties37 -a ra-
tionale that would also have had broad implications. Instead, the Court
eased its way to the decision it was obviously determined to reach by
simply asserting the presence of discriminatory "state action."'38
The result was to make Shelley famous, not for the result the Court
reached, but for the disconcerting way that it arrived there. It is discon-
certing because it illustrates with stark clarity both the Court's belief and
the truth that it is exempt from any requirement that its opinions make
sense. We know that the Court is supreme, for it has told us so, in expo-
sition of the law of the Constitution.39 Thoughtful persons might be hap-
pier not to know that so powerful an institution is also supreme over
logic and fact.
Judicial review is frequently justified on the theory that it serves as an
obstacle to the enactment into law of transient popular passions. 40 In
fact, the small coterie of lawyers-would-be-intellectuals that make up the
Court are far more subject to fads and fancies than the bulk of the Amer-
ican people. Intellectuals, both real and self-supposed, at home in a
world of words, are capable of insane notions-for example, that East
Germany, which prevents escape, is a morally acceptable nation
although South Africa, which limits entry, is not-literally unthinkable
by the average person. For a long time, and to the enthusiastic applause
of academics, the Court has behaved lawlessly in the cause of ending
racial discrimination.4 The habits and status it acquired in the process
37. See Lewis, The Meaning of State Action, 60 COLUM. L. REV. 1083 (1960).
38. 334 U.S. at 19.
39. See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
40. See, eg., Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 HARV. L. REy. 4 (1936) (oppor-
tunity for a "sober second thought").
41. For example, the Court has perverted the various titles of the 1964 Civil Rights Act from
measures designed to end racial discrimination into measures permitting or even requiring racial
discrimination. See Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979); Regents of the Univ. of California
v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
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have enabled it to continue to behave lawlessly in the service of many
other more questionable causes, such as the enactment of a national re-
gime of abortion on demand.42 The applause has continued.
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority,43 decided in 1961, is the lead-
ing Supreme Court decision on the state involvement theory of state ac-
tion. The Court there held that a privately owned restaurant that
operated in leased space in a publicly owned parking garage violated the
equal protection clause by refusing to serve blacks. Is it therefore the
rule that constitutional restrictions apply to private businesses operating
on publicly owned property? The Court was certainly not willing to say
that. Did liability attach because, in addition, national and state flags
flew over the property, as the Court took pains to point out? The Court
was not willing to say that, either. In fact, the Court was unwilling or
unable to explain its decision at all."
In perhaps the most frequently quoted statement in state action law,
the Court said in Burton: "Only by sifting facts and weighing circum-
stances can the nonobvious involvement of the State in private conduct
be attributed its true significance." 4 5 The statement, unfortunately, is
vacuous in the absence of some theory of what gives any particular fact
or circumstance relevance or weight. The sit-in cases, overturning on a
variety of near ludicrous grounds the trespass convictions of protesters
against race discrimination in stores and eating places, demonstrated
even more clearly that integrity in the performance of public office must
sometimes be sacrificed to a greater good.4 6 The Court, after all, was on
a moral crusade, and moral crusades are not to be discomfited by mere
requirements of law. To be the supreme expositor of the law, the Court
is well aware, is to be above the law.
Reitman v. Mulkey," decided in 1967, is as inexplicable as Shelley v.
See also L. GRAGLIA, DISASTER BY DECREE, supra note 3; Graglia, The "Remedy" Rationale for
Requiring or Permitting Otherwise Prohibited Discrimination: How the Court Overcame the Constitu-
tion and the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 22 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 569 (1988); Graglia, When Honesty is
"Simply Impractical" for the Supreme Court: How the Constitution Came to Require Busing for
School Racial Balance, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1153 (1987).
42. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
43. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
44. See Lewis, Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority-A Case Without a Precedent, 61
COLUM. L. REV. 1458 (1961).
45. 365 U.S. at 772.
46. See Paulsen, The Sit-in Cases of 1964: "But Answer Came There None," 1964 SuP. Cr.
REV. 137.
47. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
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Kraemer, except as another demonstration of raw judicial power. The
California legislature, reflecting the unhappy fact that the lawyers who
dominate American legislatures simply like law and are much more fa-
vorably disposed to legal restrictions than are the nonlawyers they pur-
portedly represent, enacted legislation prohibiting race discrimination by
private individuals in the sale or rental of housing. By referendum, the
people of California then voted overwhelmingly to amend the California
constitution to disallow such legislation and restore and guarantee previ-
ously enjoyed individual rights. The California Supreme Court, vying at
the time with the United States Supreme Court for the title of most ac-
tivist, held the amendment inconsistent with the equal protection clause
of the federal Constitution. The United States Supreme Court affirmed,
in a five to four decision, with the majority opinion by the mercurial
Justice White, joined by the indomitable combination of Chief Justice
Warren and Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Fortas.
The Reitman majority saw no reason to overturn the California
Supreme Court's determination that the amendment "will significantly
encourage and involve the State in private discriminations."48 The Court
did not feel obliged to explain how repealing the prohibition of an activ-
ity encourages it, while refusing to prohibit it does not. The result is that
a state may be constitutionally prohibited from repealing a law it was not
constitutionally required to enact. The important thing for the Court's
committed moralists was, of course, that the Court extend its long record
of not failing to find state action in cases involving race discrimination.
Legal scholars had busied themselves finding rationalizations for Shelley
v. Kraemer, and they could be counted upon to find rationalizations for
this decision as well. Indeed, Professor Charles Black, Sterling Professor
of Law at Yale, soon found such a rationalization.49
V.
The battle against racial discrimination was finally won in this country
with the passage of the great civil rights statutes of the 1960s. The 1964
Civil Rights Act in effect ratified the Brown prohibition of race discrimi-
nation by government. The Act applied to public schools, where segre-
gation by law-which Brown had allowed to continue under the "all
48. Id. at 381.
49. See Black, supra note 1.
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deliberate speed" formula°-quickly came to an end. It applied as well
to all federally assisted activities and programs. The Act even extended
to private discrimination in places of public accommodation and employ-
ment. The felt need to combat private race discrimination by constitu-
tional law through expansion of the state action doctrine then greatly
lessened. Some of the Justices, led by then Justice Rehnquist, began to
try to contain the extravagant proliferation of constitutional restrictions
produced by decades of judicial activism. These restrictions could not be
cut back directly; five votes were not available to overturn a single one of
the Warren Court's major innovations.5" They could, however, at least
be contained by halting or reversing the wild inflation of the state action
doctrine that resulted from the race cases.
Rehnquist's campaign for the deflation of the state action doctrine be-
gan with his opinion for the Court in Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis52 in
1972. Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall, the Justices most re-
sponsible for the Court's greatly expanded control of American society
through constitutional law, dissented. Moose Lodge, a private club regu-
lated by and holding a liquor license issued by the Pennsylvania Liquor
Control Board, refused service to a black guest of a member. Because the
Board limited the number of licenses available in each municipality,
Moose Lodge's license could affect the availability of liquor elsewhere in
the municipality.
Rejecting the state involvement theory of state action, the Court held
that the facts of Moose Lodge presented "nothing approaching the symbi-
otic relationship""3 that existed between the restaurant and the state in
Burton. It also found that the club did not perform a function "that
would otherwise in all likelihood be performed by the State."54 What the
Court says is much less important, of course, than what it does, and what
it did was permit discrimination against blacks-which Professor Black
had predicted after Reitman it would not do again"-despite the state's
regulation of the discriminator and grant of a limited resource. If symbi-
osis was now the test for sufficient state involvement in private acts, it
might, outside of the biological world, prove difficult to find.
50. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
51. See BLASI, THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT WASN'T (1983).
52. 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
53. Id. at 175.
54. Id.
55., See Black, supra note 1, at 95-100.
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Two years later, in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.,56 Justice Rehn-
quist's opinion for the Court reaffirmed and strengthened Moose Lodge's
narrow view of the state involvement theory, and adopted a narrow view
of the public function theory as well. Metropolitan Edison, a regulated
public utility, sold and delivered electricity under a certificate of conven-
ience and necessity issued by the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commis-
sion. Its general tariff, filed with and approved by the Commission,
included a provision regarding the termination of service to nonpaying
customers. Petitioner claimed that the company's termination of service
to her residence without notice and an opportunity to be heard deprived
her of property without due process of law in violation of the fourteenth
amendment.
With Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall again dissenting, the
Court rejected the claim. That the company was subject to "extensive
and detailed"57 regulation and enjoyed monopoly status did not, the
Court said, make its acts those of the state. The test was whether there
was "a sufficiently close nexus between the State and the challenged ac-
tion of the regulated entity so that the action of the latter may be fairly
treated as that of the State itself." 8 Although the Commission approved
the company's termination provision in its general tariff, the provision
was never "a subject of a hearing or other scrutiny by the Commis-
sion,"59 and mere approval did not supply the necessary nexus "where
the Commission has not put its weight on the side of the proposed prac-
tice by ordering it."60 The Court thus held in effect that there is no state
involvement theory of state action; a state is responsible only for what it
requires, not for that with which it is otherwise involved.
Petitioner also contended that Metropolitan Edison's actions consti-
tuted state action because, as the sole provider of an essential public ser-
vice, it performed a public function. The Court, however, read its white
primary and other public function cases, Marsh v. Alabama and Evans v.
Newton, as involving a private entity's exercise of "power traditionally
exclusively reserved to the State,"'" and providing utility service was not,
it found, "traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state."' 62 The
56. 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
57. Id. at 350.
58. Id. at 351.
59. Id. at 354.
60. Id. at 357.
61. Id. at 352.
62. Id. at 353.
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only example the Court gave of such a power, the power of eminent do-
main, indicates that it is likely to be a narrow category. This conclusion
is supported by the Court's decision two years later in Hudgens v.
NLRB. 3 In Hudgens, with Justices Brennan and Marshall dissenting,
the Court overruled its 1968 decision in Logan Valley Plaza64 which ex-
tended Marsh to hold that private operators of shopping centers perform
a public function.
The Court illustrated the much narrowed scope of the state action doc-
trine in its 1982 decisions in Blum v. Yaretsky65 and Rendell-Baker v.
Kohn.66 In Blum, patients in privately owned nursing homes, subsidized
by Medicaid, complained that they had been discharged or transferred to
lower levels of care by the nursing homes without being given advance
notice and an opportunity to be heard, as allegedly required by the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The discharges and trans-
fers were pursuant to detailed state regulations adopted to minimize
nursing home costs. Justice Rehnquist pointed out that the regulations
did not, however, "dictate the decision to discharge or transfer in a par-
ticular case.",67 A state "normally can be held responsible for a private
decision," he concluded, "only when it has exercised coercive power or
has provided such significant encouragement, either overt or covert, that
the choice must in law be deemed to be that of the State."'68 The state's
"mere approval or acquiescence"'69 in the challenged act was not enough.
Thus, the Court did not find state action, and, fortunately for a heavily
burdened Court and the nursing homes, did not have to decide the due
process question.
In Rendell-Baker, a privately owned school for problem students dis-
charged petitioners because of their expressions of disagreement with
school policies, allegedly in violation of the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment, which supposedly incorporates the first amend-
ment. The school received as much as ninety-nine percent of its funds
from the state, was subject to detailed regulation by the state, and was
supervised by the state in some of the its hiring decisions. Chief Justice
Burger, following Blum, wrote for the Court that the school was, none-
63. 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
64. Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
65. 457 U.S. 991 (1982).
66. 457 U.S. 830 (1982).
67. Blum, 457 U.S. at 1010.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1004.
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theless, not subject to constitutional restraints. The discharges, the
Court said, "were not compelled or even influenced by any state regula-
tion,"' and the school's relationship with the state was, as in Blum, not
"symbiotic."' v7
The limited current reach of the involvement theory of state action
was illustrated just last year in San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v.
United States Olympic Committee. 2 The United States Olympic Com-
mittee (USOC) is a private corporation chartered by an act of Congress,
which imposes certain special requirements upon it. For example, it may
not amend its constitution without providing notice and an opportunity
for a hearing, and it must allow certain groups reasonable representation
in its membership. The USOC may apply to the Secretary of Commerce
for government grants up to $16 million, and was granted $10 million
after the American boycott of the 1980 Olympic Games. Another fed-
eral statute, the Amateur Sports Act of 1978, grants the USOC exclusive
rights to the word "Olympic," exceeding the rights granted under ordi-
nary trademark law. 3 The USOC successfully sued San Francisco Arts
& Athletics, Inc. (SFAA) to enjoin it from using the word "Olympic"' in
connection with its promotion of the "Gay Olympic Games." The
SFAA thereupon filed suit claiming the USOC discriminated against it in
violation of the "equal protection component" of the due process clause
of the fifth amendment.74
In a five to four decision, the Court held that the federal charter, fed-
eral regulation, federal funding, and federal grant of exclusive rights did
not constitute sufficient federal involvement with the USOC to make the
fifth amendment applicable to its acts. The government had neither co-
erced nor encouraged the challenged act, as is necessary under Blum to
find government responsibility. Neither did the USOC perform a public
function, although its activities were in the public interest and pursuant
to the Amateur Sports Act. Public functions are those, as stated in Jack-
son and emphasized in Blum, that have been "traditionally the exclusive
prerogative" 7 of government. Conducting and coordinating amateur
70. Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 841.
71. Id. at 842.
72. 483 U.S. 522 (1987).
73. Amateur Sports Act of 1978, 36 U.S.C. § 380 (1982).
74. 483 U.S.'at 523.
75. Id. at 527.
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sports, the function of the USOC, has not been a traditional function,
much less an exclusive function, of the federal government.
Finally, there is Flagg Bros. Inc. v. Brooks,76 another, but less success-
ful, effort by Justice Rehnquist to cut back the state action doctrine.
When Shirley Brooks and her family were evicted from their home in
Mt. Vernon, New York, her furniture was stored in the warehouse of
Flagg Brothers, Inc. Flagg Brothers later wrote to Brooks that unless
she paid storage charges, it would sell her furniture, as was permitted by
the New York Uniform Commercial code. Brooks brought suit for dam-
ages and an injunction on the ground that the sale would deprive her of
her property without due process of law. Her claim rested on the fact
that she would not receive notice and an opportunity to be heard on the
issue of the underlying debt, as a series of Supreme Court decisions on
creditor remedies apparently required." In a five to three decision, the
Court, in an opinion by Justice Rehnquist, with Justices White, Mar-
shall, and Stevens dissenting and Justice Brennan not participating, dis-
missed the action on the ground that no state action was shown. The
Court pointed out that no public official was made a defendant, illustrat-
ing the "total absence of overt official involvement.""8 Plaintiff claimed
that New York had delegated to Flagg Brothers the "public function" of
"dispute resolution," a function "traditionally exclusively reserved to the
State."" 9 The Court responded that the challenged procedure lacked
"the feature of exclusivity" 8 that was supposedly present in the white
primary cases and Marsh, because New York law provided alternative
means of resolving such disputes. Nor was New York responsible for
Flagg Brothers' actions on the ground that the New York Uniform Com-
mercial Code "authorized and encouraged" them; as Jackson and Moose
Lodge made clear, a state's mere acquiescence in private acts does not
make them the acts of the state.
All of this, unfortunately, is confused and beside the point. The state
action requirement was met in Flagg Bros., not because the private
party's challenged actions constituted performance of a public function
or because the state acquiesced in them, but simply because plaintiff's
76. 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
77. See, e.g., North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, 419 U.S. 601 (1975); Fuentes v.
Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
78. 436 U.S. at 157.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 159.
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claim was that a New York law was unconstitutional. Justice Rehnquist
attempted to dispose of this central issue in a footnote, stating:
It would intolerably broaden, beyond the scope of any of our previous
cases, the notion of state action under the fourteenth amendment to hold
that the mere existence of a body of property law in a State, whether deci-
sional or statutory, itself amounted to 'state action' even though no state
process or state officials were ever involved in enforcing that body of law."'
Law exists in a state, however, only if enacted by state legislative, judi-
cial, or administrative officials, and the acts of such officials are indubita-
bly state actions.
Flagg Bros. differs from Shelley v. Kraemer in that the problem with
Shelley, as noted above, is not that there was no state action in the exist-
ence of state contract law, but that the plaintiff did not challenge the
constitutionality of that law; a state may constitutionally enforce con-
tracts. In Flagg Bros., the plaintiff did challenge the law; according to
the Supreme Court, a state may not permit creditors to seize a debtor's
property without providing the debtor notice and a hearing. It is difficult
to understand why a state's law of creditor remedies can be challenged
constitutionally when the creditor brings a dispute to court, as the Court
has many times held, 2 but not when the debtor does. Similarly, the
Court had no difficulty in finding state action in, for example, New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan,3 where it permitted a fourteenth amendment
challenge to state law in the context of a private dispute. Again, it would
seem to make no difference that under the relevant state law in New York
Times the party trying to obtain property had to go to court, while in
Flagg Bros. it was the party trying to retain property.
The Court's 1982 decision in Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co. 4 indicates
that Rehnquist's attempt in Flagg Bros. to limit the state action doctrine
was not as successful as his efforts in Moose Lodge and Jackson. In an
opinion by Justice White with Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell,
Rehnquist, and O'Connor dissenting, the Court saw no state action im-
pediment to a constitutional challenge to a state law permitting a creditor
to obtain a prejudgment attachment of a debtor's property by filing a
petition with a court clerk. That the "total absence of overt official in-
volvement" does not explain the result in Flagg Bros., even to Justice
81. Id. at 160 n.10.
82. See supra note 76.
83. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
84. 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
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Rehnquist, is indicated by the fact that he joined Justice Powell's dissent-
ing opinion, which insisted that state action was not present in Lugar
either, despite the participation of a state official. The dissenters in
Lugar are certainly right that the presence of the court clerk should not
make a difference, but the dissenters in Flagg Bros. are equally right that
his absence there should also have made no difference. Lugar falls in the
Court's time-honored tradition of dealing with irrational distinctions by
making further irrational distinctions.
VI.
Justice Rehnquist is often accused by liberals of being a judicial activist
of the right. This accusation is usually made in response to the accusa-
tion by conservatives, entirely justified, that Justice Brennan and others
are activists of the left. The response is inadequate; abuse of office by
some officials cannot be justified by showing abuse of office by other offi-
cials, even if the two groups act for opposite ends." It is also inaccurate;
with very few exceptions, such as, most notably, National League of Cit-
ies v. Usery8 6-- no one is totally immune from the corruptions of power-
Rehnquist has not attempted to return us to the Lochner 7 era. On the
contrary, he would, like the Constitution itself, leave nearly all policy
decisions to the political process. Flagg Bros. might be seen as another
example of judicial activism by Rehnquist; it certainly reflects a strenu-
ous effort to reach a desired result. But, if so, it is judicial activism in the
service of restraining judicial activism, activism in its only excusable
form.
The Court's "procedural due process" decisions-the very oddity of
the label indicates that something has gone wrong-beginning with
Goldberg v. Kelly88 and continuing through the creditors' remedies deci-
sions, are clear examples of the Court devising constitutional restrictions
out of whole cloth, on no other basis than a misguided ideological egali-
tarianism. 9 Rehnquist has made a valiant effort to get rid of those cases
by insisting that rights come only from enacted law and that it is not
85. See Graglia, Judicial Activism: Even on the Right, It's Wrong, THE PUBLIC INTEREST,
Spring 1989, at 57.
86. See supra note 20.
87, Lochner v. New York, 198 N.Y. 45 (1905).
88. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
89. See Easterbrook, Substance and Due Process, 1982 Sup. CT. REv. 85; Graglia, Would the
Court Get "Procedural Due Process" Cases Right If It Knew What "Liberty" Really Means?, 1 No-
TRE DAME J. L., ETHICS & PUB. POL'y 813 (1985).
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appropriate for Brennan and others to create additional rights, to enforce
their views of natural law in the name of the Constitution.90 Unfortu-
nately, after some initial successes on Rehnquist's part, the forces of nat-
ural law again triumphed. 9' In Flagg Bros. he attempted to contain that
triumph. It is not surprising that Flagg Bros. makes no sense, given that
the decisions it sought to limit also make no sense but are apparently
immune from attack on that ground. Nor is it surprising, of course, that
one result of this struggle is a state action doctrine of less than total
conceptual coherence.
90. See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974).
91. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985).
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